The introduction of lifecycle funds into 401(k) plans offers a rich environment in which to assess workers' portfolio allocation decisions. Consistent with behavioral models, employer design decisions strongly influence lifecycle adoption behavior while fundamentally altering portfolio characteristics, both in the cross-section and longitudinally. Yet there are also elements of rational choice by new employees, as well as choice constrained by information costs among workers with low literacy characteristics. We conclude that recent legislation encouraging riskier 401(k) portfolios will modify investment patterns, with the rate of change varying according to whether behavioral or rational elements dominate in a given setting. 
new type of investment option, TM funds have become extraordinarily popular very quickly, growing to $114 billion in assets (year-end 2006; ICI, 2007) .
The introduction of lifecycle funds into 401(k) plans offers a rich decision-making environment in which to assess the role of rational and behavioral elements in worker portfolio allocations, as well as to evaluate the impact of federal policy encouraging the use of riskier default portfolios. To assess these questions, this paper provides an empirical assessment of how over a quarter million 401(k) participants responded to the introduction of TM funds in over 250 plans over the [2003] [2004] [2005] period, using a unique longitudinal dataset from Vanguard.
The 401(k) plans in our data set allow us to observe substantial heterogeneity in the types of decision-making environments influencing portfolio decisions. In some cases, the TM new funds were simply added to existing menus, allowing us to observe workers' active portfolio choices. In other cases, the funds were designed as the plan's default investment option for participants not making active investment choices. 2 And in still other cases, participants were automatically switched or "mapped" into the TM funds from prior risk-based or static allocation (SA) lifecycle funds. The result is a robust combination of employer-designated default options, plan menu changes, and active choice by workers.
Three key findings emerge from our analysis. First, consistent with behavioral models of portfolio choice, employers do shape adoption patterns of new 401(k) investment funds through mapping effects and default fund designations. Sponsor decisions influence not only the adoption rate, but also whether participants tend to be "pure" adopters who hold only lifecycle funds, or "mixed" adopters holding them in conjunction with other funds. "Choice architecture" (Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler, 2007) does matter. However, second, not all participants are as passive as suggested by behavioral models. There are elements of rational choice by new plan entrants, who encounter the TM options for the first time upon entering the plan. And there are elements of constrained rational choice as TM funds are voluntarily selected by existing employees with low financial literacy characteristics. Menu and default effects do not explain all portfolio allocation decisions. Third, participants who adopt lifecycle funds have their retirement saving portfolios change in measurable ways, even though the TM funds do not add new asset classes to the plan menu. Thus adding TM funds reshapes the age distribution of equity exposure, eliminates extreme zero-or all-equity positions, and alters the portfolio share of idiosyncratic versus systematic risk in adopters' portfolios. These portfolio results are consistent with either behavioral or information cost-constrained models of decision-making.
Our results imply that PPA-like regulation permitting plan sponsors to offer workers professionally-managed default investment funds will modify 401(k) investment patterns, but the rate of change will depend on how the funds are introduced. Offering lifecycle funds on a voluntary basis will gradually change investment behavior, as new hires elect them and as less financially literate employees are drawn to this investment solution. A more substantial impact will be obtained if lifecycle funds are designated as the plan default. And adoption rates will be still higher, and the rate of change in portfolios more dramatic, if the employer actively maps or shifts employees to the new default fund from other plan investments.
In what follows, we first briefly review relevant literature on 401(k) investment decisionmaking, and elicit several testable hypotheses from that literature. Next we describe our dataset and summarize the methodological approach. Subsequently we discuss who adopts life cycle funds and what impact lifecycle adoption has on savers' portfolio characteristics. A final section concludes.
Related Studies and Hypotheses
Why would participants adopt TM funds when they are introduced into 401(k) plan menus? Previous studies on 401(k) portfolio choice suggest three models of adoption behavior, including a rational agents' hypothesis, a behavioral or employer menu hypothesis, and a information-cost-constrained or financial illiteracy hypothesis. In this section, we explore the implications of each of these hypotheses.
There is some controversy in the theoretical and empirical literature about whether rational investors should adopt age-based portfolio allocation patterns. Early theoretical models argued against changing equity portfolio allocations with investor age. For instance, Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) point out that constant lifetime equity exposure is optimal, given standard risk aversion and iid asset returns. By contrast, more recent work by Viceira (2001) and others indicate that equity allocations should optimally decline with age, if one allows for illiquid human capital and borrowing constraints. 3 Empirical studies on actual equity allocations by age come to mixed conclusions. Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) discern little age-based variation in equity exposure in a sample of relatively highly-paid educators. Meanwhile, Agnew, Balduzi and Sunden (2003) find that equity allocations decline by about one percent per year of age, in their study of a single corporate-sector 401(k) plan.
If participants were rational agents in the Samuelson or Merton sense, they would not be expected to adopt TM funds at all, given the funds' age-based pattern of equity exposure.
Conceivably, participants might still use the funds as part of their portfolio if the funds included previously unavailable asset classes. However, in our dataset, to be described in more detail below, the newly introduced TM funds only included asset classes previously offered to participants as individual 401(k) fund choices. Thus, the remaining rational agents' argument for adopting TM funds is that investors do have a preference for age-based rebalancing, and that the type of rebalancing on offer matches their own preferences for such a feature. For such investors, holding a TM fund would be expected to reduce portfolio transaction costs -in our case, the time and effort associated with ongoing rebalancing. Thus, all other things equal, TM fund adopters would be more likely to be high-income participants, given the opportunity costs associated with their time and effort. 4 A corollary is that rational agents adopting TM Funds would experience no change in portfolio risk and return characteristics, inasmuch as the specific appeal of the funds is due solely to the convenience of age-based rebalancing, and not to their unique underlying investments.
A second hypothesis regarding lifecycle fund adoption, resulting from a behavioral economics perspective, posits that workers' portfolio choices are driven by employer menu decisions. Prior studies have suggested that participants spread their money evenly among 401(k) plan fund offerings using a "1/n" heuristic (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001) or across a subset of funds using a "conditional 1/n" rule (Huberman and Jiang, 2006) . The fraction of the menu in specific types of assets, such as equities or high-cost active equity funds, also appears to shape participant asset allocations (Bernartzi and Thaler, 2001; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2006) . 5 More broadly, participant decisions are influenced by the "choice architecture" implicit in the design of a 401(k) plan (Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler, 2007) . A possible explanation for these menu-based effects is inertia, which has been noted in retirement planning generally Rabin, 1999 and 2001) , in 401(k) investment choice (Madrian and Shea, 2001) , and in ongoing rebalancing of portfolios (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003 , and Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi, 2006a and 2006b .
Participants appear to "go with the flow" and often fail to make active investment choices in 401(k) plans.
These studies suggest a second hypothesis, namely that introducing lifecycle funds will reshape portfolios purely due to sponsor menu effects -in our case, when employers map workers into TM funds from prior SA funds, or when they designate TM funds as a plan default.
Evidence supportive of this hypothesis would include finding that mapping and default effects would influence not only lifecycle plan adoption, but also alter fundamental risk and/return characteristics of the portfolios.
A third hypothesis regarding lifecycle fund adoption arises from the literature on financial illiteracy and participant decision-making, which suggests a model of rational choice subject to information costs. 401(k) participants readily admit they are inexperienced in making investment decisions (Fontaine, 2006; Vanguard, 2003) , they are unfamiliar with common financial concepts (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007) , and they regularly misunderstand investments, believing, for instance, that money market funds include stock investments or that employer stock is safer than a diversified equity portfolio (John Hancock, 2002) . More broadly, many lower-income and lower-wealth households fail to hold any equity at all although economic models predict they would be better off with at least a small equity position (Campbell 2006 TM adopters to assess the impact of TM funds on portfolio characteristics. This TM adopter sample includes participants who elected at least one TM fund and whom we observe both one month prior to and six months after the fund is introduced.
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Variables available for empirical analysis include a wealth of detail on participant 401(k) account balances, investment holdings and account contributions 10 , as well as key socioeconomic characteristics including age, sex, household income, and non-retirement financial wealth.
11
Also available are important features about each plan's offered investment menu, including the number and types of investment funds offered and other plan design details. In addition our data set includes monthly returns for all investments offered in our plans over an eight-year period (including the three-year period under analysis as well as the five years preceding it). nearing or in retirement). The underlying investments offered through the TM funds did not represent new asset classes or investment styles offered by the plans in our sample.
13 Table II here
In our sample TM funds were introduced into 401(k) plans in different ways. For some plans, TM funds were the first type of lifecycle fund ever offered to participants. As indicated in Panel B of Table II , almost half (45%) of the full sample was introduced to TM funds de novo, while only 14% of the TM adopters were in this class. A large number of plans also previously offered static allocation (SA) or risk-based lifecycle funds, and sponsors varied in how they subsequently added TM funds. Some portion of our sample was offered TM funds on top of preexisting SA funds (39% for the full sample; 51% for adopters), while the rest were switched or "mapped" by their employer from SA to TM funds (16% v. 35%). 14 In the case of mapping from SA to TM funds, sponsors could either switch all participant SA balances and contributions into the new TM funds, or allow existing balances to remain undisturbed, while switching future contributions into TM funds. In either case, the new TM allocations would reflect the sponsor's decision to move the money rather than representing an active employee election. Finally, in some cases the employer designated the new TM funds as the plan default. The default option would influence those participants, principally new hires, who were either automatically enrolled, or who enrolled on a voluntary basis but refused to make an active investment choice.
Portfolio Characteristics
Table III describes the investment characteristics of TM adopters' portfolios "before" and "after" the TM funds were added to the menu-specifically, one month prior to adoption (time t-1) and six months later (time t+6). Panel A summaries the allocation of participant contributions by major asset class, including cash (money market or guaranteed investment contracts), bonds, balanced or lifecycle funds, US equities, employer stock, and international equities. The most notable feature is that many TM adopters contributed to balanced or SA lifecycle funds before the new menus were introduced; these funds accounted for 79% of pure adopters' and 35% of mixed adopters' contributions. This statistic again points to the importance of controlling on the prior presence of the pre-existing menu design in order to evaluate the impact of TM funds on participant behavior.
Table III here
Panel B of Table III reports mean values for three portfolio attributes measured for TM adopters, again on a before and after basis. The first attribute we examine is the percent of the portfolio held in equity. 15 Before the change, our mean TM adopter held two-thirds of his contributions going to equities; six months later, equity allocations rose by 1.4% for all adopters before controlling on other factors. Pure adopters devoted somewhat less and mixed somewhat more to equity before the change. With the advent of TM funds, pure adopters changed their equity allocations slightly less (1.0% versus 1.8%), again before controlling on other factors.
The second portfolio attribute reported in Panel B of Table III shows how the participants' portfolios changed in terms of the overall systematic or risk-adjusted return.
Systematic returns refer to the sum of the risk-free rate during the period, f r , and each participant's factor return, or e t i r , . Factor returns are computed using a three-factor model based on US equities, US bonds and international equities because, as noted earlier, the TM funds in our dataset are composed of index-based funds mirroring these three asset classes. To calculate portfolio returns, we first construct a risk-loading matrix for all k investment options in our dataset. Specifically, we regress the excess return (over Treasury bill returns) for each of the k assets in our universe on three market indices: the value-weighted CRSP portfolio, the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index (LBA), and the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Europe, Australia and Far East (EAFE) Index. 16 The systematic return for each 401(k) investment option is simply its factor exposure times the average factor returns over the period; the participant's factor return is simply the weighted average return of his or her factor exposures over the period. 17 The risk-free rate is added to the participant's factor return (and annualized) to arrive at the returns shown in column 2 of Panel B (Table III) .
Two features stand out about the return calculations. One is that the returns rise across the board, for all adopters as well as for pure and mixed adopters, before controlling for other factors, particularly time effects. Second, the difference in returns between pure and mixed adopters is small. For example, on a "before" basis, mixed adopters held 15% more equity than pure adopters' (70.7% is 15% higher than 61.4%), but their returns were only 2% higher (6.52%
is 2% higher than 6.38%). This suggests that those who later became pure TM investors had, probably through SA and balanced fund holdings, successfully constructed more efficient portfolios with lower equity exposure but similar expected returns.
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The third portfolio attribute reported in Table III Table III for all lifecycle plan adopters: it is eliminated for pure TM adopters, and it falls for mixed adopters.
Who Adopts TM Funds? A Multivariate Analysis
To explore the "treatment effect" associated with TM fund introduction, we estimate the probability of lifecycle adoption, LCAdopter i,j,t which refers to the probability that the ith participant holds a TM fund in the jth plan in month t. The multivariate model is as follows: When an employer designates TM funds as the default investment, this boosts the likelihood that participants will adopt TM by 11.4%, or three-quarters the pre-TM mean. We term this the "PPA effect," indicative of how much participation in TM funds may increase as a result of sponsor decisions to select a TM default fund under the Pension Protection Act. The time since the menu was enhanced is also a related factor as indicated by Time Count, the number of months since the funds were introduced. Participation rises by 2% after 10 months of having the TM funds on offer. (Vanguard, 2003 and . Table IV also demonstrates that TM funds are more likely to be adopted by participants with characteristics typically associated with low levels of financial literacy. These include young, lower paid, and female participants, as well as those with low 401(k) balances and low levels of non-financial retirement wealth. These findings are supportive of our financial literacy hypothesis, of rational agents constrained by information costs. TM funds, by their very simple design, eliminate such information constraints and replace all portfolio choices with the selection of a single expected retirement year. Our findings are also inconsistent with our rational agents' hypothesis, which suggested that higher-income participants would select these funds due to the opportunity costs associated with rebalancing.
Interestingly, offering more funds in the 401(k) menu slightly reduces participation in TM funds.
The effect is small (having 10 additional funds means a 2% lower chance of holding TM funds)
but it does offer some modest support for the finding from the prior literature that participant holdings are influenced the fraction of the plan investment menu represented by a given fund
option.
Next we separately analyze the differences between pure versus mixed lifecycle adopters. is equal to 1 if the participant is a mixed adopter; 2 if he is a pure adopter; and 0 if he is a nonadopter (the reference group). Empirical results are reported as marginal effects. As before, there are potent effects of sponsor menu and default fund selections, and again new entrants are particularly likely to be TM adopters. The differences in estimated coefficient magnitudes between the two types of investors are also revealing. If SA funds were previously offered, this is more likely to result in mixed adoption than in pure adoption (5.1% v. 3.7%) . One possible explanation is that participants were more likely to adopt SA funds rather than TM funds on a mixed basis. We also see, unsurprisingly, that defaulting workers into TM funds is more likely to lead to pure rather than mixed adoption.
Table V here
There are also interesting demographic differences between pure and mixed adopters.
Pure adopters are more likely to be new plan entrants, and also more likely to be female, younger, lower income, and have lower 401(k) and non-retirement wealth, than participants who do not adopt TM funds. This pattern seems consistent with the conclusion that this group is most in need of professional financial advice, perhaps because of low financial literacy. Mixed adopters are also likely to be younger and female, but they tend to be middle income and middlewealth participants, compared with non-adopters. The mixed adopters results are therefore subject to conflicting explanations. On the one hand, mixed adopters may be engaged in naïve diversification by allocating only a portion of their portfolio to a "portfolio in one fund" solution.
On the other hand, mixed adopters are more affluent, and so are more likely to be more financially literate. Mixed adoption could be evidence of a more sophisticated approach to investing. 22 To determine how TM funds fit into mixed investors' portfolios, more research is required into actual investment intentions.
In sum the evidence reveals two influences in 401(k) plan investment patterns. Clearly employer-driven menu and default patterns help shape participant choice of lifecycle funds, confirming the behavioral hypothesis. We find little support for the pure rational agent hypothesis that affluent participants facing large opportunity costs from rebalancing will be most likely to adopt lifecycle funds. Yet there is also a substantial group of participants actively selecting the new funds, mainly new entrants and participants who appear to be less financially literate. Finally, while pure adopters seem to be perceive lifecycle funds as suitable for their needs, mixed adopters appear to have more complex motivations.
Portfolio Effects of Adding Lifecycle Funds
Next we turn on an assessment of how lifecycle fund adopters' portfolios change when lifecycle funds are introduced into their portfolios. Using a difference-in-difference approach, each participant is observed one month before and six months after adopting the TM fund. Three dependent variables are of particular interest, namely the participant's percentage allocation to equities, his portfolio's systematic returns, and his share of nonsystematic risk as a percent of total portfolio variance (NSR/TV). Each of these dependent variables, summarized in a vector we term PORTFOLIO i,j,t , taking the following form: (2) Model A includes just these terms; Model B adds interaction terms (INTERACTION) to test whether specific groups display differential treatment patterns when lifecycle funds are introduced. For example, LC_Treat*Young allows us to examine the differential impact of TM treatment on participants under age 35. For this difference-in-difference approach we must exclude the DEFAULT and NEW ENTRANT treatment variables: all participants are observed both before and after the lifecycle treatment effect, so we cannot observe either true default effects or the entry of new hires into the plan.
Table VI summarizes estimates for the equity allocation models, differentiating results for pure and mixed adopters. The variable LC_Treat in Model A captures the simple change in equity allocation after controlling for differences in participant and plan features, timing and industry fixed effects, and plan-level heteroskedasticity. In Model A, all else constant, pure adopters devote less to equity (1.8 percent) but no change is seen for mixed adopters. Model B adds treatment interactions for participant and plan characteristics, the most important of which is with respect to age. Now it is clear that for pure and mixed adopters, younger workers invest more in equity after TM funds are introduced (LC_Treat + LC_Treat*Young), while middleaged and older people reduce their equity share. Figure 1 summarizes the age effects; the oldyoung difference increases by 8-10 percentage points. It is worth noting that the changes in equity shares by age remains meaningful for mixed adopters, who on average direct one-third of their portfolio contributions to TM funds.
Table VI and Figure 1 here
Not only does the overall allocation to equity change when TM funds are introduced, but the distribution also becomes less dispersed as shown in Figure 2 for both plans offering TM funds de novo (top panel) and those offering SA funds previously (bottom panel).
(Corresponding statistics measuring the dispersion of equity allocations are presented in Table   A1 in the Appendix.) When TM funds are offered de novo, participants had previously clumped their equity holdings at two focal points, namely 0 and 100%, with another group holding a mid-range of equities (61-65%, a typical allocation in many balanced funds). After the new funds are offered, adopters' portfolios now concentrate around the five key target percentages embodied in the main TM fund offerings. (Of the six funds offered, two had near-identical asset allocations.)
In fact, the cross-sectional standard deviation of equity allocations among pure adopters falls by half, from 34 to 16 percent, after TM funds are offered. For mixed adopters, here too, the zero and all-equity allocations are mostly eliminated, though the changes are attenuated. Overall, the standard deviation of equity allocation distributions for adopters falls by one-quarter.
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Figure 2 here
Next we analyze expected returns and risk characteristics before and after TM funds are offered. Table VII reports results for Models A and B, similar to those in Table VI . The first two columns show that pure adopters can expect returns to rise by 19-21 basis points per year when they shift to an all-TM portfolio. Also interesting are the changes by age, with young pure adopters seeing expected returns rise by an annualized 13 basis points (.0019-.0013). By contrast, older pure adopters can expect lower returns by 25 basis points (.0019-.0011) per year, partly due to their having more cash at older ages. 24 For mixed adopters, depicted in the next two columns of Table VII , changes in returns are not statistically significant. These results, we believe, are inconsistent with the pure rational agent model of TM fund adoption, and strengthen the behavioral and information-cost or literacy hypotheses. Introducing lifecycle funds in our sample does not expand the range of capital market assets that plan participants could elect. Yet they result in marked changes to portfolio and return characteristics.
That is, equity allocations change materially by age as a result of sponsor menu changes, for both pure and mixed TM adopters. Pure adopters see systematic returns rise; both pure and mixed adopters see a large decline in the portfolio share of idiosyncratic risk. These findings suggest that these funds help those laboring under financial illiteracy constraints, perhaps by eliciting or making more obvious the notion of age-based equity variation. They also confirm behavioral menu-driven effects where introducing new lifecycle funds triggers changes in the risk and return characteristics of participants' portfolios.
Discussion and Conclusions
In Third, among existing participants switching to lifecycle funds from other portfolios, lifecycle fund adoption does materially change portfolio characteristics. Specifically, it narrows the distribution of equity exposure, eliminating 100% and zero-equity portfolios, while enhancing the age distribution of equity exposure. Further, it reduces participants' portfolio idiosyncratic risk. These results further strengthen the diagnosis of both behavioral and information-cost or literacy-constrained models among TM fund adopters. The results undermine the narrowly rational agent argument for adoption based on the notion of convenient age-based rebalancing, and the opportunity costs incurred by high-wage workers in engaging in such portfolio activity.
Ultimately, our results suggest that strategies for improving portfolio allocations, such as default fund rules proposed under the Pension Protection Act, will vary in efficacy and speed depending on the path taken. How quickly 401(k) participant investment patterns over time will depend on how the funds are introduced, and also the composition of each firm's workforce.
Providing TM funds on a voluntary basis alone changes plan investment behavior only gradually, via new plan entrants (where the rate of change will depend on workforce turnover), and via lowliteracy participants drawn voluntarily to this new investment solution. If an employer designates lifecycle funds as a default, it will further raise adoption. And if the employer shifts or maps participants from their existing portfolios to something like an age-based lifecycle fund, this will result in the largest and most rapid change in portfolio characteristics.
25
Ultimately, our findings underscore the fact that even with sponsor-driven menu effects and default decisions, active decision-making by workers remains important as well. While the US 401(k) system is gradually shifting toward greater reliance on default investment choices, it remains the case that many millions of existing participants make investment choices on their own. In the end, it will be their behavior over time, not solely sponsor choices, that will determine how quickly 401(k) portfolio allocations change in response to the introduction of a novel investment feature like lifecycle funds. 
Subset of TM Adopters
Note: Participant characteristics measured at 12/05 for full sample and six months after TM introduction for Adopter sample. participants in the full dataset, 189,968 were included in their plan both one month before and six months after the TM funds were introduced. 10 We focus our portfolio analysis on 401(k) contributions rather than fund balances because contributions are more reflective of forward-looking intentions and unbiased by prior holdings.
11 Household income is imputed based on zip codes as is non-retirement financial wealth, and is provided by the IXI Company.
12 Over 95% of pure adopters contribute to only one TM fund; mixed adopters contribute to 4.5 funds on average. 13 Prior to the introduction of TM funds, all of the sample plans offered broad-based US equity index and high-quality US bond index funds; only seven plans did not offer at least one international equity index fund. Tang (forthcoming) shows that all but a handful of the plans in the broad universe from which our plans were drawn were "efficient' in that they spanned eight broad global capital market indexes. The less efficient ones were only modestly so, and did not differ from the others markedly in their plan offerings.
investments have zero excess returns by definition, while over our study period, bonds earned excess returns of 23 basis points per month. Our younger pure adopters moved from a cash exposure of 3% to 0% when moving to TM funds, while older participants moved from 9% to 0%. For mixed adopters, younger participants reduced equity holdings slightly, from 8% to 6%, while older participants moved from 11% to 9%.
25 Sponsors forfeit so-called optional 404(c) fiduciary protection when undertaking such mapping, though it remains an appropriate strategy if the plan fiduciary judges such a move to be in the best interests of plan participants.
